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The pricing of water in a university town: 
An economic analysis of draining a cash cow 
B. Patrick Joyce and Thomas E. Merz 
School fBusiness and Engineering Administration, Michigan Technological University, Houghton 
Abstract. This paper analyzes some economic issues involved with the common 
practice of using metered water rate revenue to fund debt retirement associated with 
the provision of municipal water and wastewater services. We conclude that rather 
than simply raising the metered rate, city officials hould seriously consider increasing 
the tax rate levied under the local property tax. There is an important trade-off in the 
choice of a price policy. An increased property tax rate can result in tax savings to 
some home owners, which lowers their net expenditure for water. However, a 
corresponding decrease in the metered rate may increase water consumption, which in 
turn raises operating cost. In order to do what is best for home owners, it might make 
sense to give other customers (e.g., a university) an easy ride, even if the latter, 
because of its low (inelastic) price elasticity of demand for water, is viewed by the 
municipality as a cash cow. 
1. Introduction 
In November 1992, residents of Houghton, Michigan, 
received the following letter from their city government: 
Dear Water/Sewer Customer: 
As you are aware, the Portage Lake Water and Sewage 
Authority is currently constructing a new 20 million dollar 
sewage treatment plant .... We have been recently notified by 
the Authority that commencing next year, our monthly sewage 
treatment charge will increase from its current $24,000 per 
month to approximately $80,000 per month. This increase is for 
Bond Debt Retirement only and does not include any other 
maintenance or operational costs. 
Therefore, effective December 1992 your monthly water/ 
sewage rate will increase by fifty percent. Once the impact of 
this increase is measured on Fund Revenues, a further rate 
adjustment in the magnitude of approximately 10 to 15% will be 
forthcoming in June of 1993. 
Prior to December 1992, customers were charged uniform 
monthly metered rates of $0.75 per hundred cubic feet and 
$1.79 per hundred cubic feet for water and wastewater 
(sewage), respectively. After December 1992 the wastewater 
rate rose to $3.06 per hundred cubic feet. Thus while the 
combined water-wastewater rate rose 50%, the increase in 
the wastewater rate was 71%. 
The new wastewater treatment plant is also used by the 
city of Hancock. Cost sharing of the debt between the two 
cities is based on historical usage of water. Like Houghton, 
Hancock has announced a metered rate increase to cover its 
share of debt retirement. 
A metered rate is a user fee resulting in a positive price for 
incremental water use. A metered rate allows for a number 
of possible price structures, such as uniform rates, which 
may vary from peak to off-peak periods; block rates, which 
result in a rate change for water used beyond a certain 
amount; and step rates, which result in a different rate on all 
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water used during a billing period once usage exceeds a 
given amount [e.g., Young et al., 1983; Lyman, 1992]. 
In contrast, a flat rate, or lump sum charge, results in a 
zero price for incremental water use. The frequently cited 
study by Hanke[ 1970] found that substituting a metered rate 
for a flat rate caused the volume of water consumed to 
decline. Subsequent studies have also found that the quan- 
tity of water demanded declined as its price rose [e.g., 
Hogarty and MacKay, 1975; Danielson, 1979; Carver and 
Boland, 1980; Howe, 1982; Hanke and de Mare, 1982; 
Young et al., 1983 ; Lyman, 1992]. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some economic 
issues involved with the policy of raising the metered water 
rate to obtain additional revenue to fund debt retirement. In 
particular, we address the following question: Rather than 
raising the metered rate, should a city choose to raise the tax 
rate levied under its local property tax? In addressing this 
question, two points are stressed. First, an increase in the 
metered rate raises revenue and decreases consumption and 
hence the variable (operating) cost associated with the 
provision of water. Second, raising property taxes to fund 
debt retirement allows home owners who utilize tax deduc- 
tions or credits to shift some of the burden to other taxpay- 
ers. The accounting stance adopted here is purely local, and 
the tax shift to other areas is therefore ignored. As we will 
demonstrate, the optimum mix of metered revenue and 
property tax revenue depends on various parameters faced 
by decision makers. 
2. Tax Setting 
Unlike payments arising from a combined metered water- 
wastewater rate, property taxes are deductible under the 
federal income tax. In effect, this tax preference subsidizes 
the consumption of local public services for individuals who 
itemize on their federal income tax form. 
Generally, if r is the proportional tax rate applied to 
residential real estate with an assessed value (the tax base) of 
V, property taxes paid, T, equal rV. Let t represent the 
percentage of a $1 increase in T offset by the federal 
2807 
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deduction for itemizing federal taxpayers. Thus the deduc- 
tion of T lowers the effective "price" of local government 
services from T to (1 - t)T. Since we focus on the provision 
of water and wastewater services, henceforth we assume 
that property taxes, T, are earmarked for the water- 
wastewater utility. 
In addition, many states, including Michigan, have a 
"circuit breaker" that provides a refund of state income 
taxes if residential property tax payments exceed a specified 
percentage of the taxpayer's income. A circuit breaker 
works like a tax deduction except that the net cost of a $1 
increase in T is reduced by the credit rate c rather than the 
taxpayer's federal marginal income tax rate t. In other 
words, c represents the percentage of property tax offset by 
the property tax credit against the state's income tax. 
However, if the decrease in state income tax of c reduces the 
federal deduction by c, federal taxes would increase by ct, 
resulting in the taxpayer's losing the federal deduction. In 
this case, the net cost to the circuit-breaker-qualifying 
household of increasing T by $1 is 1 - t- c + ct = 
(1 - t)(1 - c). Therefore the appropriate method of 
financing the debt on the new wastewater treatment plant is 
of interest to those taxpayers who itemize and also to those 
for whom c is nonzero. 
For Michigan taxpayers, c takes on values of 0%, 40%, or 
100% (see Fisher [1993] for additional discussion on property 
tax credits). In 1990, 38% of Michigan residents filing federal 
income tax form 1040 claimed a property tax credit [Michi- 
gan Department of Treasury, 1992]. 
The circuit breaker and the deductibility of local property 
taxes result in a loss of revenue to federal and state treasur- 
ies. This lost revenue, commonly called a "tax expenditure" 
[Hyman, 1993, p. 501], represents an intergovernmental 
subsidy to residents of local communities which have a 
relatively heavy reliance on property taxes. Any such sub- 
sidy is likely to be offset by higher federal or state tax rates 
to compensate for the lost tax revenue. Thus the substitution 
of local property taxes for metered water rates has equity 
implications. It is likely to adversely affect individuals who 
do not itemize or use the circuit breaker and therefore might 
result in transfers from low-income individuals to high- 
income individuals. Such distributional considerations, 
while beyond the scope of this paper, raise questions as to 
the appropriateness of tax preferences as a means for 
providing subsidies. 
Houghton city officials were asked why the city did not 
raise property taxes to meet the debt payments associated 
with the new wastewater treatment plant. Their immediate 
response was: "If we did that we would be giving a free ride 
to the largest single user of water in the city." This user is 
Michigan Technological University (MTU), which utilizes 
approximately 50% of the water distributed (see Table 1). 
The city of Houghton sends out approximately 1400 monthly 
water bills in addition to MTU's, of which approximately 
1200 are to residential customers. Excluding MTU' s approx- 
imately 7000 students, Houghton's population is approxi- 
mately 7500 (1990 census). 
Is it always in the interest of home owners to initiate a 
price policy which prevents a university or other large, 
tax-exempt users from taking a free or "easy" ride with 
respect to locally provided public services? An extreme 
example shows why the answer to this question is no. 
Suppose that all home owners of a community pay 0% of 
marginal property tax increases (c = 1). In this case, they 
could shift the entire debt burden to the state government by 
setting the metered rate equal to 0 and financing both debt 
and variable cost out of property taxes. All water customers 
would be free riders. 
As demonstrated in the next section, city officials should 
recognize an important trade-off when choosing a price 
policy. Raising the property tax rate does result in tax 
savings to some home owners, which lowers their net 
expenditure on the public service. However, a correspond- 
ing decrease in the metered rate is likely to increase water 
consumption, which in turn raises variable cost. 
3. Modeling 
Suppose a city comprises two types of home owners: 
those for whom c or t (or both) > 0 and home owners for 
whom c = t = 0. We assume that the city government 
chooses the metered rate and property tax level so as to 
minimize total expenditure (EXPEND) on municipal water- 
wastewater services by both sets of home owners, subject to 
the constraint that the water-wastewater utility budget be 
balanced. City officials are viewed simply as agents elected 
by home owners (principals), and they serve the interests of 
home owners. We abstract from any analysis of the princi- 
pal-agent problem the case in which agents pursue personal 
goals that conflict with principals' interests [Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1992, p. 625]. 
While a municipality may face an upper limit on its 
property tax rate, we assume that this constraint is not 
binding and nothing restricts decision makers from using 
property tax revenue to fund debt retirement payments. For 
example, conditional grants from the federal or state govern- 
ment might be used to partially finance the construction of a 
new wastewater treatment plant. The donor might specify 
that user-based charges be levied to retire any debt associ- 
ated with the construction. Such a mandate, however, need 
not imply that metered rates can serve as the only price 
instrument. One might reasonably argue that if property 
values and water usage are positively related, a property tax 
represents a user fee (the property tax as a user fee is 
discussed by Rosen [1992, p. 385]). In any event, our 
analysis demonstrates that preventing the use of property 
taxes as a price instrument might not be in the interest of 
local home owners. 
Our objective function accords well with the evidence that 
home owners are most likely to constitute the majority of 
voters in local elections [Jackson, 1974; Piele and Hall, 
1973]. For non-residential property owners and residential 
landlords, water bills and property taxes are deductible 
Table 1. University's Share of City of Houghton's Total 
Water Consumption, 1988-1992 
University' s 
Year Share, % 
1988 48.2 
1989 46.4 
1990 47.2 
199! 46.6 
1992 47.4 
Source: City of Houghton. 
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business expenses. Alternatively, one might assume that 
choices should be viewed as optimum from the standpoint of
the median voter, who is likely to be a tax itemizer [Rosen, 
1992, p. 596]. Even in this case, it makes sense to view the 
government asattempting to minimize the tax burden of its 
spending policies to home owners [Epple and Schipper, 
1981]. 
Since we assume an exogenous property tax base V, 
choosing the property tax rate r is equivalent to choosing the 
property tax level T. Thus city officials choose T and P so as 
to 
min EXPEND = [PQu(P) + T(1 - t)(1 - c)]a 
+ [PQu(P) + T](1 - a) (1) 
subject to 
PQ(P) + T- 13Q(P) - D = 0 (2) 
where 
P price per unit of water (uniform metered rate); 
Q(P) total quantity of water consumed as a function of P 
=QH(P) + Qc•(P) (H, household; U, university); 
T total property taxes (- r¾); 
r proportional property tax rate (0 -< r < 1); 
V residential property tax base; 
/3 constant marginal cost (MC) of providing a unit of 
water (/3 > 0); 
D debt retirement payment; 
a proportion of home owners who itemize or use 
circuit breaker (0 <- a -< 1); 
t marginal federal income tax rate (0 -< t < 1); 
c circuit breaker rate (0 -< c -< 1). 
In treating a as exogenous, we ignore two possible cases 
that an increase in r can cause: (1) taxpayers who were 
previously ineligible for the credit or previously not federal 
tax itemizers become eligible or itemize with the new higher 
property tax rate and (2) taxpayers reach the maximum 
allowable credit (in Michigan the maximum credit is $1200). 
Note that in equations (1) and (2), T is not an argument of 
the function Q•( ) and hence Q( ). The sensitivity of Q• 
to changes in property taxes might be near or equal to 0 
when T is restricted to covering debt retirement, D. In this 
case, home owners might recognize that changing QJu will 
not affect their property taxes (D is a fixed obligation 
independent of Qu)- However, when other factors are held 
constant, an increase in T reduces household disposable 
income, which may cause the demand for water to drop. On 
the other hand, if variable cost is covered by property taxes, 
one might discover Qu to be sensitive to T owing to both an 
income and substitution effect [Hogarty and MacKay, !975], 
assuming that home owners are informed as to what portion 
of variable cost is being covered by property taxes. In this 
analysis, we simplify matters by assuming that changes in T 
have no effect on Q•. 
The Lagrangian is 
L = EXPEND + •'[PQ(P) + T- 13Q(P) - D] (3) 
where r is the Lagrange multiplier. Letting L i denote the 
partial derivative of L with respect o variable i, the Kuhn- 
Tucker minimum conditions are [Chiang, 1984, p. 722] 
Lr= 1-a[t+c(1-t)]+r_>0 (4) 
L •, = Q•(1 + ©H) + ,[Q•(1 + O,u) 
+ Qu( 1 + ©u) - 13(dQ/dP] >-0 
L•, = dRu/dP + r[dR•j/dP + dRu/dP 
- d(TVC)/dP] -> 0 
L,= PQ(P) + T- !3Q(P) - D = O 
(5) 
(6) 
PL i, = 0 (8) 
where ©• = (dQH/dP)(P/Qu) and ©cr = (dQu/dP)(P/ 
Qv) are the household and university price elasticity of 
demand for water, respectively (19u and 19 r• -< 0). 
We assume a production process with constant marginal 
cost [MC = d(TVC)/dQ = /3]. Thus average variable cost, 
13Q/Q, equals/3. Hereinafter, total variable cost,/3Q, and 
average total cost, (13Q + D)/Q, will be denoted by TVC 
and ATC, respectively. Notice that for all Q > 0, ATC >/3. 
Letting R• = PQi for i = [H, U], the term Qi(1 + Oi) in 
(5) is simply dRi/dP. Finally, d(TVC)/dP = 13(dQ/dP) <- O. 
The above model represents the short run. The debt 
retirement payment, D, represents a fixed cost associated 
with an existing plant. We assume that any increase in 
wastewater caused by a change in price policy can be treated 
through the design capacity of the existing plant. 
If the optimum value for the property tax level, T*, is >0, 
then (4) and (7) imply 
r=a[t+c(1-t)]- 1 (9) 
where the bracketed term, representing tax savings to home 
owners on each additional dollar of property taxes, is < 1, as 
c_<l. 
In order to interpret conditions (4)-(8) as well as to 
illustrate a possible trade-off between tax savings and vari- 
able cost, four cases are discussed. 
Case 1. Suppose dQ/dP < 0 and no home owner item- 
izes or takes the property tax credit (a = 0). With a = 0, (9) 
results in r = -1. Substituting this result into (5) yields 
-Qv(1 + O•) + 13(dQ/dP) >- O, which can be satisfied by 
an equality if (an unlikely event) the price elasticity of 
demand for the university is elastic (© cr < - 1 ). P would be 
increased until d(TVC)/dP = dRv/dP. The reduction in 
total variable cost, the marginal benefit to home owners of 
raising P, is equated to the city's decline in revenue from the 
university, the marginal cost to home owners of raising P. 
For inelastic (O• > - 1) or unitary (Ocr = - 1) price 
elasticity, with T > 0, (5) fails to satisfy the necessary 
condition for a constrained minimum. Thus, T* is set equal 
to 0 and the balanced budget constraint (equation (6)) 
requires that the optimum metered price, P*, satisfy (P - 
13)/P = D/(PQ). In other words, P* = ATC >/3. 
Case 2. Suppose Q r• = 19• = 0 and 0 < a <- 1. With no 
university, Q n = Q. Substituting (9) into (5) yields the 
condition 1 > 0, implying that P* = 0. T is the only 
instrument used to finance total variable cost and debt 
retirement. 
This case serves to highlight he trade-off (or lack thereof) 
mentioned above. Since household (total) consumption of 
TLr = 0 (7) 
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Table 2. Short-Run and Long-Run Implications of the Property Tax Instrument 
Short Run (D > 0) Long Run (D = 0) 
1. T=O 2. T>0 3. T=0 4. T>0 
P > MC P > MC, T < D (outcome 1) P -- MC 
P = MC, T = D (outcome 2) 
0 < P < MC, T > D (outcome 3) 
0<P<MC 
From case 4, interior solutions for T and P are consistent with parameter values: 0 < a -< !, ©H > -1, and O u > -1. 
mentioned above. Since household (total) consumption of 
water is perfectly price inelastic, OH -- O, reducing P to 0 
does not cause an increase in total variable cost,/3QH. P* is 
set equal to 0 to capture the full tax advantages associated 
with property tax financing. This result holds regardless of 
the value for a. With d(T¾C)/dP -- O, home owners for 
whom t - c - 0 are indifferent to the value of P. 
Case 3. Suppose Q v = 0, OH < 0, and 0 < a < 1. 
Substituting (9) into (5) yields 
a[t + c(1 - t)][dRH/dP] >- -{1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]} 
ß [d(TVC)/dP]. (10) 
Since d(TVC)/dP < 0, satisfying (10) by an equality re- 
quires that dR H/dP > 0, which is the case when the 
household price elasticity is inelastic (© H > --1). Inelastic 
demand is consistent with empirical estimates of On [e.g., 
Danielson, 1979; Carver and Boland, 1980; Young et al., 
1983; Lyman, 1992]. Satisfying (10) by an equality means 
that P* is also >0. 
Recall that the term [t + c(1 - t)] represents the tax 
savings to home owners on each dollar raised through the 
property tax. Thus the left-hand side of (10), air + c(1 - 
t)][dRH/dP], is the marginal cost to home owners of in- 
creasing P; it represents the lost tax savings resulting from 
not raising an additional dollar of revenue through the 
property tax. As one would expect, as a, t, or c rises, the 
marginal cost to home owners of increasing P also rises. The 
fight-hand side of (10),-{1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]}[d(TVC)/ 
dP], is the marginal benefit to home owners of increasing P; 
it represents the reduction in total variable cost which could 
have been covered from property taxes. Clearly, minimizing 
EXPEND requires that the trade-off between tax savings 
and variable cost be taken into account. 
Case 4. With Q t• > 0, dQ/dP < O, and O < a < 1, 
substituting (9) into (5) yields 
a[t + c(1 - t)][dRn/dP] 
m {1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]}[dRw/dP- d(TVC)/dV]. (11) 
The sign of the term dR v/dP is dependent upon the magni- 
tude of O v. if the university's demand for water is inelastic 
(Or > -1), the fight-hand term dRv/dP is a component of 
the marginal benefit to home owners of increasing P. It 
captures the increased revenue collected from the university 
rather than through the property tax. As long as the univer- 
si.ty has an inelastic demand for water, dR v/dP > 0, city 
officials view it as a nonvoting cash cow. The more inelastic 
©v, the more "liquid" the cash cow. 
In conversation with the director of facilities management 
at MTU, we were informed that "MTU would most likely 
not attempt to cut back on water consumption, given the 
recently announced rate increase; decreasing consumption 
would only result in a higher metered rate." Therefore it 
appears that MTU is not prepared to initiate any conserva- 
tion policies. This suggests that the university's price elas- 
ticity of demand, © t•, might be near 0 over the relevant price 
range. Thus (11) might be satisfied by an equality, in which 
case minimizing EXPEND requires that both T and P be 
greater than 0 and the optimum metered rate be less than the 
average total cost. The university would be an easy rider, 
since it would pay a smaller portion of the debt retirement 
than its portion of total water consumption. An important 
message is that no matter how liquid the cash cow is, city 
officials should not ignore the tax advantages available to 
home owners through revenue mechanisms other than me- 
tered rates. 
4. Short- and Long-Run Implications 
Suppose city officials ignore tax preferences associated 
with property tax financing (T = 0). In the short run, with a 
balanced budget, the metered rate (P) equals the average 
total cost (ATC) but exceeds marginal cost (MC). However, 
in the long run (D = 0), P = MC, resulting in an efficient 
level of water consumption. These results are summarized in 
columns 1 and 3 of Table 2. 
With T > 0, in the short run, the balanced budget 
constraint requires that T be either less than, equal to, or 
greater than D. In column 2 of Table 2, these three outcomes 
are labeled 1, 2, and 3, respectively. However, in the long 
run, P is less than MC, causing the consumption of water to 
exceed the efficient level. The overconsumption of water 
occurs because someone else is subsidizing local consump- 
tion. 
Thus another important message is that introducing the 
property tax instrument into the water pricing policy initiates 
the long-run problem of inefficient use of society's re- 
sources. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper demonstrates that depending on values for 
demand, cost, and tax parameters, the common practice of 
average total cost pricing might be inferior to price policies 
which involve financing some or all debt retirement and 
possibly even some of the variable cost through property 
taxes. In order to do what is best for some customers (home 
owners), it might make sense to give other customers (e.g., 
a university) an easy fide, even if the latter is viewed by the 
municipality as a cash cow. 
From the perspective of home owners, the appropriate 
price policy requires that city officials (1) be aware of the 
possible trade-offbetween tax advantages, variable cost, and 
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revenue obtained from large, tax exempt users of water and 
(2) obtain reliable stimates ofrelevant parameters. 
Our analysis has focused on the short-run interest of home 
owners within a given community. We have drawn attention 
to the fact that taking advantage of the tax code's favorable 
treatment of property tax financing results in a long-run 
inefficient allocation of resources and raises issues related to 
the distribution of income within and across communities. 
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